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Jaqualine Lindridge 
Principlism: when values conflict  
Abstract 
 
To ensure morally justified decisions, clinicians are encouraged to apply ethical 
theories and frameworks.  Beauchamp and Childress’ ‘Four Principles’ approach to 
medical ethics, or ‘Principlism’ for short, is highly regarded as a simple methodology 
for considering ethical dilemmas, and is common to many undergraduate clinical 
programmes.  On occasion, ethical dilemmas are complex and one or more of the 
four principles come into conflict with each other.  Critics of the approach have 
suggested that there is a lack of guidance on how to resolve this conflict. 
This paper will argue that Principlism facilitates an organised and thorough method 
of reflecting upon an ethical problem and is well suited to the pre-hospital setting.  
The problem of how to resolve conflicts between the principles will be explored, 
demonstrating the merit of the approach through its application to a real-life moral 
problem from the pre-hospital setting. 
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Introduction 
Beauchamp and Childress’ ‘Four Principles’ approach to medical ethics, or 
Principlism, is highly regarded as a simple methodology for considering ethical 
dilemmas.  Despite its propitious beginnings, it has been suggested that there is a 
lack of guidance on how to resolve conflict which arises between the principles 
despite robust academic defence of the approach (Gillon, 2015, Macklin, 2015). 
This paper will argue that Principlism enables an organised and thorough method of 
reflecting upon an ethical problem which is well suited to the pre-hospital setting.  
The problem of how to resolve conflicts between the principles will be explored, 
demonstrating the merit of the approach through its application to a moral problem. 
Principlism 
The four principles approach to biomedical ethics provides a straightforward 
framework for considering moral dilemmas, and is based on four moral principles: 
respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2013).  These principles are considered binding unless in conflict with one 
another.  If all the associated obligations can be justifiably met, the agent will have 
produced a morally acceptable answer to their ethical question.   
 
This systematic approach has invited long criticism for what has been perceived as a 
‘cookbook’ approach to ethical thinking.  John Harris describes the approach as a 
“useful checklist” and denigrates it as suitable only for the inexperienced ethicist 
(2003), which whilst somewhat disapproving credits the approach of being of at least 
some use.  This view is echoed by Richard Nicholson who describes the approach 
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as valuable in “…providing a simple framework comprehensible to non-
philosophers.” (1994).  More recently M J Lee argued that Principlism is 
‘philosophically incoherent’ and suited only to Western moral intuition (2009) and one 
study suggested that the four principles lack heterogeneity with the common morality 
(Christen et al, 2014). 
 
It cannot be said however that Principlism offers a deductive system of reasoning 
from which genuine thought is absent. The principles provide the backbone for 
structuring thoughts; a framework on which reasoning can be structured, rather than 
an ethical ‘sum’.  Hence, if a moral agent attempted to use the approach in a purely 
deductive manner, adding inappropriate rigidity to the principles, then the approach 
would lose its value as a framework for thorough reasoning.  The four principles 
approach provides a structure for considering an ethical dilemma, with emphasis on 
the thought of the agent as well as the principles themselves.  The framework 
encourages integration of all the relevant data and avoids inadvertent neglect of 
important issues.  Use of the framework in this way can prevent an impulsive and 
potentially unethical decision being reached in a pressured situation (Daugherty 
Biddison et al, 2014). 
 
Specification 
 
The principles themselves are abstract moral norms which are widely accepted, 
however there is considerable potential for dissent regarding their scope.  For 
example, it is widely agreed that a person’s autonomy should be respected, but there 
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is extensive disagreement on who actually possesses autonomy (Dworkin, 1998).  
Arguments regarding the scope of a principle can be resolved using ‘specification’. 
 
Specification is described as: “…the progressive filling in and development of 
principles and rules, shedding their indeterminateness and thereby providing action 
guiding content.” (Beauchamp, 1995. p16).  This process is concerned with refining 
the “range and scope” of the principles (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013), and 
allows the broader facts to be tapered into a usable form.  It is not enough to merely 
state that one should adhere to the obligation of non-maleficence; this is too absolute 
a concept.  To be of practical use, the obligations need to be qualified so they can 
guide an agent’s thought in a specific situation.  This process may involve extracting 
rules from the principles, or the addition of further terms which clarify intent.  
Whatever the form of the specification, the process itself must be morally justifiable 
(Gillon, 2015) and the mechanism itself is reliant on its own transparency in order 
that manipulation and abuse are avoided (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013).  
 
Balancing 
 
Where specification fails to resolve a conflict, another means of resolution is 
required.  Balancing considers the “weight or strength” of the principles (Beauchamp 
and Childress, 2013).  Six conditions are provided which when met provide the 
justification which allows the agent to follow one principle over another: 
 
1. 1. Better reasons can be offered to act on the overriding 
norm than on the infringed norm. 
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2. 2. The moral objective justifying the infringement must 
have a realistic prospect of achievement. 
3. 3. The infringement is necessary in that no morally 
preferable alternative actions can be substituted. 
4. 4. The infringement selected must be the least possible 
infringement, commensurate with achieving the primary goal 
of the action. 
5. 5. The agent must seek to minimise any negative effects 
of the infringement. 
6. 6. The agent must act impartially in regard to all affected 
parties; that is, the agent’s decision must not be influenced by 
morally irrelevant information about any party. 
 (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013, p23) 
 
Observation of these conditions facilitates further thought and deliberation, and 
promotes objectivity, thereby reducing the likelihood of a subjective or intuitive 
response. 
 
A Virtuous Agent 
 
It is perhaps inevitable that conflicts will occur between the four principles, even in 
the simplest of moral dilemmas.  It is the presence of such of conflicts, and the need 
for their resolution which promotes the greatest disquiet amongst critics of the 
approach (Thornton, 2006).   
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Derived of deontology, Principlism is compatible with other theories which recognise 
the norms on which the approach was built.  Here lies a lack of theoretical moral self-
sufficiency has been a source of dissatisfaction for some, with Richard Nicholson 
taking this to herald a risk not only of abuse, but also moral ‘aridity’ which fails to 
encompass the complexities of existence (1994).  It is counter-argued that the 
approach is not actually proposed as a moral theory, but as a framework for ethical 
thinking, and the compatibility with other moral theories is an advantage; as Gillon 
observes, this offers “…a way of bypassing the deep and probably unresolvable 
conflicts between competing moral theories.”  (1994, p336).   
 
The process of justified balancing facilitates the agent’s pursuit of a preponderant 
principle in a situation of conflict (Macklin, 2003).  Even with the safeguards of the six 
balancing conditions, there is the risk of an intuitive decision being reached, or a 
decision being derided as subjective as a result.  An agent can be required to offer 
‘better reasons’ for one norm over another, but this offers no way of formalising how 
or why one reason should be better than another (Paulo, 2016), and could be seen 
to defunct the approach completely.  It is as important therefore, that there is a 
recognisable theory or approach to making this decision, as it is that a recognisable 
approach to distinguishing which prima facie principle should take precedence 
(Veatch, 1995). 
 
There is a risk that the balancing of principles can fall victim to the subjective opinion 
of the agent, even if all of the six conditions are met.  It is argued therefore, that the 
agent would need an overarching moral theory of their own to complement their use 
of the four principles approach.  Virtue ethics (VE) presents a suitable bedfellow for 
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principlist agents who are balancing conflicting principles. VE can support the 
process of balancing by metering the presence of any vices, and ensuring a virtuous 
decision-making path is followed (Gardiner, 2003).  It should be acknowledged that 
the decisions of balancing are, at least in part, intuitive by nature and virtue ethics 
provide much needed validation and a context for the decision-making, as Alastair 
Campbell concludes: “…VE and the four principles are “partners in crime” when it 
comes to the final justification of our moral intuitions.” (2003). 
 
Although the principle of Respect for Autonomy is discussed first, this does not imply 
any primacy over the remaining principles (Beauchamp & Childress. 2013).  
However, Professor Gillon advocates that as a principle, respect for autonomy is 
primus inter pares, or the “first among equals” (2003), based on the premise that 
autonomy itself is of such great moral importance, and is so crucial to the other 
principles that they cannot exist independently of it.  Whilst this argument provides a 
method of resolving an autonomy related conflict, (not to say that the resolution 
would be morally right), it remains unconvincing.  To argue that the principle would 
be the ‘first among equals’ suggests that this principle should be satisfied as a 
priority over the remaining principles.  As discussed in Angus Dawson and Eve 
Garrard’s subsequent paper, if this were to be the case, then it would not be the ‘first 
among equals’, it would simply be the first, and the remaining principles would be 
relegated into a firmly secondary position (2005).  In order for the principles to retain 
their prima facie nature, there can be no hierarchy amongst the principles.   
 
 
A Moral Dilemma… 
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A man assaults a woman, stabbing her several times in the chest before trying to cut 
his own throat.  The first paramedic to arrive at the scene is alone and faced with two 
patients, both of whom need immediate life-sustaining interventions.  The road 
outside is gridlocked and further assistance is likely to take some time to arrive.  
Patient A has penetrating wounds to the neck and is in a peri-arrest condition.  
Patient B has several penetrating thoracic wounds, and is found to be in cardiac 
arrest.   
 
The prognosis in penetrating thoracic trauma, in the context of out-of-hospital cardiac 
arrest is poor.  Patient B is unlikely to survive, even with the immediate interventions 
the solo paramedic is able to employ.  However, death is guaranteed without 
intervention.  Patient A is in a peri-arrest condition and the injuries appear survivable; 
however, the severity of the injuries indicate that is likely that he will die without 
immediate interference. 
 
Here, the problem is the absolute limitation of the healthcare resource available, in 
this example access to a single paramedic.  The paramedic’s dilemma therefore, is 
which patient to treat?   
 
Respect for Autonomy 
 
Gillon describes autonomy as the: “…capacity to think, decide, and act on the basis 
of such thought and decision freely and independently and without…let or 
hindrance.”  (1985, p60).  The principle of respect for autonomy in this particular 
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scenario has limited application; this is not to say however that it is irrelevant.  Both 
of the patients are unconscious, and therefore incapable of autonomous action 
according to this definition. 
 
In the absence of an advance decision or statement of wishes of the patients’ 
respective references, the best interests standard must replace the principle of 
respect for autonomy (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013).  There are no such 
advance decisions or statements available for either patient.  Patient B is the victim 
of an assault, and there is nothing to suggest that if autonomous, she would decline 
treatment.  Patient A however is suffering from self-inflicted injuries making it more 
difficult to predict what his autonomous choice would be. 
 
Non-maleficence 
 
The principle of non-maleficence is described by Beauchamp and Childress as the 
obligation “…to abstain from causing harm to others.” (2013, p150).  The principle is 
universally applicable to acts which would cause harm, or the risk of harm. 
 
Harm is a by-product of most medical treatments in some severity or another. These 
harms can be balanced with their potential rewards.  The discussion of the relative 
harms associated with major medical gains are well documented, and will not be 
discussed here.   
 
Beneficence 
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Beauchamp and Childress define the principle of beneficence as a positive obligation 
to contribute to the welfare of others (2013).  Although this principle enjoys a close 
relationship with utility, as Beauchamp and Childress point out, this principle is not 
representative of the absolutist utilitarian ideal; rather it is a specification of a wider 
principle which allows the agent to balance probable outcomes while considering the 
net benefits.  One of the limitations of the absolutist principle of utility is that the 
theory remains silent on the subject of what benefits should be maximised (Aacharya 
et al, 2011), but from a healthcare triage perspective the saving of the most life is a 
well-established goal. In a principlist approach, beneficence is considered 
proportionally and the burden justified by the benefit which results (Macklin, 2003).   
 
In our dilemma, Patient A is critically unwell; without treatment, it is likely that cardiac 
arrest will occur within minutes, thus increasing the risk of death significantly.  Patient 
B however is already in cardiac arrest, if interventions are withheld from her death is 
a certainty. 
 
Where the goal is to save the most lives, the beneficent action would be to treat 
them both, so here a conflict has arisen.  Beauchamp and Childress observe futility 
as a morally justifiable specification for overriding the obligation to treat her (2013).  
Recovery from a traumatic cardiac arrest is, on balance, unlikely and so delivering 
life-sustaining care to this patient could be argued to be futile.  However, it is at least 
possible that this patient’s cardiac arrest is reversible; although this rests on a series 
of unlikely possibilities.  However unlikely as the patient’s survival is, it is still 
possible; therefore the condition of futility is not met. 
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Another specification justifying omission is based on whether the burdens of a 
treatment outweigh the benefits is also described within the approach.  This 
condition allows an omission, where the burdens of the treatment outweigh their 
benefits (where the patient is neither able to consent to or decline treatment).  Whilst 
aimed at the balance of burdens and benefits to the individual patient, it is suggested 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013) that in some situations that the burden versus 
benefit balance could, and should include other related parties.  In this scenario, the 
benefits to both patients are equal, however the burdens are not.  Patient A’s chance 
of meaningful survival is significantly higher than patient B’s, therefore he has more 
to lose and his burden is greater.  In this dilemma, providing interventions to Patient 
A has the greatest probability of producing meaningful survival and is likely to 
achieve the greatest net benefit (Butler et al, 2016).  This result is likely to be 
acceptable to both utilitarians and virtue ethicists.  The situation is regrettable, and 
because the ideal solution (that there is no resource allocation problem and that both 
patients receive treatment) is impossible; this solution presents the most morally just 
and prudent choice according to the principle of beneficence, although for reasons of 
moral distance this may be difficult conclusion to reach (Shaw and Gardiner, 2015). 
 
Justice 
 
Justice is described by Gillon as the “...fair adjudication between competing 
claims…” (1985, p94), and encompasses legal justice, the obligation to respect the 
(morally satisfactory) laws of the relevant jurisdiction; distributive justice, which 
requires a fair distribution of scant resources, and justice which respects people’s 
rights within law and society.   
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Both patient A and patient B are justly entitled to receive treatment, although the 
limited resources available allow only one of the patients to receive it.  Therefore, 
this principle must also be specified to guide the agent to know who it is morally right 
to treat.  Within healthcare, as a moral priority, medical need is taken to be the most 
relevant standard (Cookson, 2015).  Welfare maximisation and personal merit (the 
perpetrator versus the victim) can also be considered, but are morally questionable 
reasons on which to base the decision in the modern world (Butler et al, 2016).  
Medical need is a priority which can be empirically decided, whereas welfare 
maximisation and personal merit are subjective and relative at best. 
 
In our dilemma, Patient B is already in cardiac arrest but Patient A as yet is not; so, 
considering medical need alone Patient B would take priority according to the 
principle of justice, an outcome which is consistent with contemporary approaches to 
multi-casualty triage (Mallia, 2015). 
 
A conflict of principles 
 
In this dilemma, there is a conflict between the principles of justice and beneficence.  
The principle of beneficence indicates that patient A should be treated; however, the 
principle of justice indicates that patient B should be treated.   
 
Specification has already been used, and will not help to further resolve this conflict.  
From the perspective of a virtuous agent, balancing will be used to determine which 
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of the principles will take precedence and the six conditions described earlier will be 
used to temper and justify the promotion of one principle over another. 
 
Firstly, what reasons there are to act according to one principle over another must be 
considered.  One argument may be to sacrifice justice for a more realistic possibility 
of saving one life and letting one person die, rather than sacrifice (the principle of) 
beneficence and likely allow two to die. However, if we also consider the second 
condition this argument rests on the presumed futility of patient B’s condition and 
holds only if the agent believes survival is implausible, it is not enough to merely say 
that her chance of survival is lower than that of Patient A (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2013).  An alternative proposition might be to prefer the principle of justice over the 
principle of beneficence, due to the intrinsic presence of utilitarianism in the triage 
process, and the inherent inattention to the principle of justice offered by the 
utilitarian view (Misselbrook, 2015). 
 
Condition three requires that the infringement of a principle be necessary and that no 
morally preferable alternative exists.  This condition is fulfilled; there is no alternative; 
only one patient can be treated. 
 
The fourth condition holds that the infringement of the principle must be the least 
possible infringement, and must be consistent with achieving the original goal.  If 
justice were to take priority, the risk of both patients dying would be increased.  
Allowing beneficence to take priority would maximise the survival of at least one 
patient.  Promoting beneficence could be argued to present the least possible 
infringement and is compatible with the original goal to save life (Butler et al, 2016).  
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However, the weight of Patient B’s claim to justice is strong in the context of the 
certainty of death without treatment, arguably, death would be less certain for Patient 
A, even if he suffered a cardiac arrest.  Therefore prioritising his care would not be 
the least possible infringement, neither would it meet the fifth condition to minimise 
any negative effects of the infringement (Gillon, 1994). 
 
The sixth, and final, condition requires the agent to act impartially and without 
influence from morally irrelevant information in their decision making.  Consider if 
Patient A was the victim, and not the assailant; this final condition requires the agent 
to revisit the decision to ensure that it was made on morally acceptable grounds 
(Aacharya, 2011), and not for example on the basis of blameworthiness or 
innocence.   
 
In this case, I propose that the process of specification and balancing resolves the 
dilemma; and the principle of justice takes precedence.  Patient B receives the care 
and it is argued that the infringement to the principle of beneficence is morally 
justified. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Criticism of Principlism arises from the premise that as an approach it is insufficient 
to merely state the principles, and that an agent needs further guidance in what to do 
when the principles themselves conflict.  Principlists however, offer specification and 
balancing as an approach to resolving such conflicts, and I have argued here that 
this apparatus is helpful in unpicking ethical dilemmas the pre-hospital setting. 
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The application of the four principles approach to a moral dilemma typical of the pre-
hospital setting has facilitated a thorough and systematic evaluation of the problem, 
and encouraged and ordered and focused approach to decision-making, promoting a 
balanced appraisal of the facts.  Each principle and its subsequent obligations have 
been considered individually and the relative weight and scope of each balanced and 
justified in order to resolve the conflict between the principles of beneficence and 
justice, leading to a morally acceptable conclusion.  The conclusion may be mirrored 
by other approaches and supported by specific moral theories (Macklin, 2015) and 
this is a testament to the transferability and value of the approach. 
 
Ethics in practice 
 
This paper applies normative ethical theory to a real-world pre-hospital problem.  
Principlism can be applied directly in clinical practice when considering ethical 
problems, however in this case the theory has been used to structure reflection on a 
time critical decision, after the event.  
 
In practice, triage decisions made by paramedics and other pre-hospital clinicians 
are made swiftly; there is no time at the scene for an ethical debate about which 
patient(s) should be prioritised at a multi-casualty incident.  The application of 
normative ethical theory to such examples may also enable practitioners to explore 
their understanding of macroethics and understand in greater detail underpinning 
bioethical approaches to managing multi-casualty incidents, and how this translates 
into the microethical decisions made by individual clinicians, for individual patients. 
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The four principles approach to medical ethics remains a useful approach to 
considering a moral problem in this context, and provides a valuable framework for 
clinicians evaluating a practical and morally difficult dilemma. 
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